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Microfinance is one of the most commonly applied development 
interventions of our time. It is also one of the most gender-biased. In part, 
this is due to targeting. However, it might also relate to the emphasis 
placed by microfinance providers on group-loans. If women have a 
comparative advantage when it comes to functioning in groups, they might 
self-select into microfinance provided as group loans, while men seek 
alternative sources of credit. This paper explores the possibility that such a 
comparative advantage exists and that it relates to women’s greater 
propensity to feel shame and/or induce feelings of shame in others. It uses 
data derived from an economic experiment conducted in 12 Zimbabwean 
villages to test a series of hypotheses. The findings suggest that men 
regard others less than women when deciding how to behave; that, even 
after controlling for this, they are more likely to attract criticism; and that 
they are no less responsive than women to such shame-inducing, social 
sanctioning. Finally, while men are no more inclined to sanction others 
they are less effective than women at effecting a resultant improvement in 
behaviour. 
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1. Introduction 
Microfinance has become one of the most commonly applied development 
interventions of our time. In that application, it is also one of the most gender-biased. 
In part, this is due to deliberate targeting by service providers (Goetz and Gupta 
(1996)). However, it might also reflect the emphasis placed by microfinance providers 
on their most celebrated innovation, the group-lending contract. By linking the fates 
of self-selected group members, the group-lending contract effectively harnesses local 
information and social assets (networks of trust, shared behavioural norms, local 
reputations) and applies them to the problem of enforcement. It provides a means 
whereby the traditional mechanisms of social control applied in informal financial 
arrangements such as rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) can be 
combined with externally supplied financial capital to provide loans for poor 
households who lack collateral (Besley, Coate, and Loury (1993), Besley and Coate 
(1995)). If women have a comparative advantage in this modus operandi, they might 
self-select into the client groups of microfinance providers, while men seek alternative 
sources of credit. That ROSCA membership, which is less prone to targeting,  tends to 
be dominated by women supports this hypothesis (Morduch (1999), Johnson (2001)).  
But what form does this comparative advantage take? Johnson (2001) 
proposes that it relates to women’s greater responsiveness to social sanctions. During 
a series of post-survey meetings, she presented her Kenyan research subjects with data 
showing that, when faced with constrained access to formal financial services, women 
are more inclined to join ROSCAs while men are more inclined to borrow from 
friends and relatives. When asked why this might be, both men and women stated that 
women are more likely to feel ashamed if they fail to meet their obligations towards 
groups. Men, on the other hand, are more individualistic. Finding independent   3 
empirical evidence to support these claims is difficult. Wydick (1999) shows that in 
Guatamala a sense of moral obligation to repay, a willingness to apply pressure to 
encourage repayment on the part of others, and a willingness to sanction those who 
fail to repay all improve microfinance groups’ repayment performance. However, 
while he controls for the gender homogeneity of the loan groups, he neither controls 
for nor explores the effect of variations in male-female shares in group membership 
on either repayment performance or these three enforcement-related variables.  
 Here, we treat the explanation provided by Johnson’s research subjects, that 
women have a comparative advantage in group-based activities because they are more 
highly motivated by shame, as a hypothesis to be tested. We then conduct the test not 
with survey data but with data from an economic experiment. This enables us to avoid 
several of the econometric problems that are commonly encountered in this area of 
research, most notably selectivity bias, while sharpening the focus on men’s and 
women’s functionalities in groups. 
 To facilitate testing, we break the hypothesis into two:-  
1. that compared to women, men have less regard for others when deciding 
how to behave; and 
2. that men are less responsive than women to social or shame sanctions 
imposed by others. 
Hypothesis 1 is about the relative selfishness and cooperativeness of men and women. 
Experimental economists have been exploring such gender differences for some time 
(see for example Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977), Mason, Phillips, and 
Redington (1991), Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1992), Eckel and Grossman (1998)). 
While experimental economists have also explored the impact of social sanctioning on   4 
cooperative behaviour (see for example G
￿
chter and Fehr (1999)), gender differences 
in this regard have yet to be investigated. This paper provides tests of both hypotheses 
using data derived from an economic experiment conducted, not in a university 
laboratory, but in 13 Zimbabwean villages. Thus, the subjects that took part in the 
experiment were diverse compared to the more commonplace samples of students as 
experimental subjects, while having many characteristics in common with users of 
micro-finance throughout the developing world. These similarities include a 
dependence on small-scale agriculture, low incomes, and a vulnerability to severe 
income and consumption shocks. Further, the subjects in each village-specific 
experimental session would have been familiar with one another’s prior behaviour in 
situations involving social dilemmas. As this would also be true in the context of 
group-based micro-finance, it adds to the verisimilitude of the experiments. 
  The economic experiment, which is described in detail in section 2, involved a 
repeated public goods game played anonymously and then both before and after an 
opportunity for the players to comment on each other’s contributions. Within the 
context of the game, social sanctions took the form of criticism during the round of 
comments. Data was collected on players’ contributions and on who was criticised by 
whom. We use this data to test hypotheses 1 and 2 and then go on to test three other 
related hypotheses that are also relevant to the functioning of groups: –  
3. that men are less effective than women at sanctioning others; 
4. that men are more likely than women to escape sanctioning by others when 
they behave in an antisocial manner; and 
5. that men are less likely than women to sanction others who behave in an 
anti-social manner.    5 
The paper has six sections. Following this introduction, section 2 describes the 
design of the experiment in greater detail. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy 
used to test the hypotheses stated above. In section 4, we describe both the 
experimental and the survey data and the results of some preliminary tests. The more 
detailed empirical analysis is presented in section 5 and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
A total of 308 individuals distributed across twelve villages took part in the 
experiment in the year 2000. Eight of these villages are the result of a resettlement 
exercise, which took place in the early 1980s. The remaining four are situated on, so 
called, communal land and are more traditional in terms of social structure. One 
experimental session was held in each village. In the eight resettled villages every 
household was invited to send one nominee over the age of fourteen to the 
experimental session in their own village.
1 In the four non-resettled villages, which 
are somewhat larger, random samples of 25 households were drawn and only sampled 
households were invited to send nominees. Any nominee who was unable to identify 
and rank three numbers was asked to return home and find another nominee to take 
their place. Between thirteen and 39 subjects took part in each session.  
 The experiments were conducted outside with the nominees seated 
approximately two metres apart. They were asked not to talk or attempt to 
communicate in any way with one another and were constantly watched. They were 
taught the game by a Shona-speaking research assistant and were then asked a series 
of questions before playing the games. The description of the games, the questions, 
                                                 
1 Eight nominees aged 12 or 13 turned up to represent their households. After consulting with all the 
villagers present in the related sessions, these nominees were allowed to play.   6 
and the nominees’ instructions were all scripted and the script was adhered to in all 
twelve sessions. Nominees’ questions were answered by repeating the relevant part of 
the script. The research team (one of the authors and four Zimbabwean assistants) was 
the same for every session and efforts were made to standardise actions and 
demeanours. 
In the public goods (PG) game each player is placed in a group containing n 
members (themselves and n-1 others) and given an initial endowment, y. Each then 
has to decide how much of this endowment to contribute to a public good, gi (0 
￿  gi 
￿  
y). Decisions about gi are made simultaneously. The sum of the group’s contributions 
is multiplied by a factor a (1 < a < n), and the resulting amount is shared equally 
among the n nominees. Thus, the final payoff to each player is  å = + - =
n




1 p . 
For an anonymous, selfish money-maximiser the dominant strategy in this game is to 
free-ride by setting gi equal to zero. This is because  . 0 1 < + - = ¶ ¶ n a gi i p  However, it 
follows from  0 1
1 > + - =
¶





p  that the group’s payoff, å =
n
i i 1p , is maximized if 
each member contributes all of their endowment, i.e., sets gi equal to y. In Zimbabwe 
the nominees’ initial endowments, y, were set equal to Zim$100.
2 The number of 
nominees per group, n, was set at five and the factor, a, was set at two. Thus, the 
marginal payoff to the public good was 0.4. The games were played with pens and 
specially designed forms. The forms presented the nominees with a set of six 
contribution levels (Zim$0, Zim$20, Zim$40, Zim$60, Zim$80, and Zim$100). They 
had to select one of these by drawing a circle around it. Assistance was provided to 
those who had difficulty reading the form or drawing their circles, but they had to 
make their own decision about the level of contribution. After the selections had been 
                                                 
2 Zim$100 was approximately equivalent to US$2 at the time of the experiments.   7 
made, the forms were collected and the calculations executed. Both the nominees’ 





1 , and their final payoffs,  i p , were 
written on the forms before returning them to the nominees.  
 In each session, the nominees played four such PG games. At the outset they 
were told that they would be playing several games, but were told neither the exact 
number nor whether the games would be identical or different.
3 They were also told 
that at the end of the session one of the games would be picked at random (by drawing 
a number from a hat) to determine their earnings. The same groups of five nominees 
were maintained throughout the sessions and the nominees were reminded of this at 
the start of each game.
4 Each player knew that the other four nominees in their group 
were both from their village and present in the session. However, they did not know 
their exact identity. Thus, their initial expectations about other nominees’ behaviour 
would have been formed on the basis of knowledge gleaned during everyday life. In 
ten of the sessions the total number of nominees was not a multiple of five. In each of 
these, one of the groups contained two ‘virtual’ players. These virtual players always 
contributed the village mode in the current game. The virtual players’ contributions 
are not included in the analysis but those of the nominees who played with them are 
included.  
                                                 
3 To an experimental economist, this will appear odd. Normally one would state the number of games 
to be played so as to elicit end game effects. However, in addition, experimentalists would go to great 
lengths to ensure that their subjects did not know one another or, at least, did not know that they knew 
one another. That our nominees knew one another is a critical feature of our study. Thus, to assume that 
the last game that they played in our experimental sessions was an end game could be misleading. By 
choosing to be ambiguous we guarded against such an assumption ever being made. 
4 By preference, experimental economists would conduct experiments based on PG games twice, once 
with stable groups across games, as we have done, and once remixing of groups between games. The 
former is referred to as the ‘partner treatment’ and the latter as the ‘stranger treatment’. We chose to do 
only the partner treatment to guard against the word ‘stranger’ being associated with the data and to 
maximize the chance of the Zimbabwean nominees learning and behaving strategically.          8 
The first two games were played anonymously. The third game was played 
publicly, i.e., the players had to announce their contributions to everyone present in 
the session. This game was then followed by a ‘discussion round’. Up to this point the 
game resembles one of the treatments executed by G
￿
chter and Fehr (1999) with 
students in Zurich and replicated by Henrich and Smith (2000) with the Machugenga 
in the Amazon basin. In Zimbabwe, however, the discussion round was organized in a 
way that facilitated the required data-capture. The nominees were invited to make 
public, verbal statements about each other’s decisions. Special care was taken not to 
lead the nominees. The aim was to provide them with an opportunity to comment, 
while leaving them free to complement, criticise, or remain silent as they saw fit. One 
research assistant would stand beside each player in turn and say ‘Player number …, 
Mr/Mrs …, contributed $... Does anyone have anything to say about that?’ Two other 
research assistants recorded which nominees were criticised and by whom. A fourth 
research assistant recorded as much of the substance of the criticism as time allowed. 
These three independent records were reconciled directly after the experimental 
session and the analysis presented below is based on the reconciled data.
5  Once the 
discussion round was complete, a fourth PG game was played. Like the third, this 
game was played publicly.  
 
3. Empirical strategy 
Each of the hypotheses stated in the introduction can be treated as an alternative to a 
null hypothesis stating that there is no difference between men and women. Then, by 
                                                 
5 Even though it was designed to mimic a process that had naturally occurred in the villages after prior 
games, the discussion round could have caused offence. For this reason we held group discussions after 
each session and, wherever possible, followed-up with trusted key informants. Neither exercise yielded 
any indication that the villagers were unhappy with the games.   9 
applying econometric methods to the experimental data, each pair of hypotheses can 
be tested. To test hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 and their corresponding nulls, we conduct an 
analysis of contributions during the four PG games. To test hypotheses 4 and 5, we 
conduct analyses of how many other players sanctioned each player for making either 
too low or too high a contribution and how many low and high contributors each 
player sanctioned.  
 The test of hypothesis 1, requires a comparison of male and female players’ 
contributions across all four games. To make this comparison we, first, graph the 
contributions made by male and female players and conduct a series of t-tests. Then, 
to ensure than differences in behaviour between the sexes are neither suppressed nor 
inflated by variations in other social, cultural, or economic factors, we regress 
contributions, gi, on female, a dummy variable that takes the value one only for 
female players and a vector of social, cultural, and economic control variables. This 
vector of control variables is made up of six sub-vectors. The first sub-vector, xi, 
contains four other individual player characteristics: age, their age in years; schooling, 
their years in formal school; married, a dummy variable that takes the value one if the 
player is currently married; and head, a dummy variable that takes the value one if the 
player is the head of a household. The second sub-vector, hi, contains three 
characteristics of the player’s household: hhsize, the number of people in the 
household; livestock, the value (in thousands of Zimbabwean dollars) of the 
household’s livestock holdings in 1999; and income, the income of the household (in 
thousands of Zimbabwean dollars) in 1999. The third sub-vector, li, contains four 
variables that capture the extent to which the player’s household is socially linked to 
other households in the village: blood, is the number of other households in the village 
to which the player’s household is related by blood; marriage, is the number of other   10 
households in the village to which the player’s household is related by marriage; 
sametribe, is the number of other household heads in the village that belong to the 
same tribe or lineage group as the player’s household head; and memberships, is the 
number of non-religious group memberships maintained by members of the player’s 
household. The fourth sub-vector, ri, is a set of five dummy variables that capture the 
religion of the player’s household head. The fifth, ei, is a set of six dummy variables 
capturing the tribe or lineage group of the player’s household head. And the sixth, vi, 
is a set of eleven village dummy variables that capture all village-level effects, 
cultural, economic, and social. Thus, we estimate: 
it i i i i i i i it v e r l h x female g 1 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 e a a a a a a a a + + + + + + + + =  1. 
where t identifies the game from which the data was derived, the error term,  it 1 e , is 
assumed to be i.i.d. normal, and  0 a  to  7 a  are the vectors of coefficients to be 
estimated.  
 We estimate this equation for contributions in each of the first three games, 
i.e., with t set equal to 1, 2 and 3. However, when analysing the data from the fourth 
game we introduce another vector, 4 i s , of variables controlling for differing social 
sanctioning experiences during the preceding discussion round. This vector includes: 
shamers lowi, the number of people who shamed i for making too low a contribution 
in the third game; shamers highi, the number of people who shamed i for making too 
high a contribution in the third game; shamers low vil. av.i, the average number of 
people shaming other players in the same village for making the same level of 
contribution as i in the third game; and shamers high vil. av.i, the average number of 
people shaming other players in the same village for making the same level of   11 
contribution as i in the third game. Thus, the model for contributions in the fourth 
round is:  
4 2 4 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 4 i i i i i i i i i i s v e r l h x female g e a a a a a a a a a + + + + + + + + + =  2. 
where  4 2i e  is assumed to be i.i.d. normal. Then, we add a vector of three game 
dummies, it gm , set  it s equal to zero for all  4 ¹ t  and re-estimate using the sample 
pooled over all four games:  
it i it i i i i i i i it gm s v e r l h x female g 3 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 e a a a a a a a a a a + + + + + + + + + + =  3. 
where  i 3 e  is assumed to be i.i.d. normal.  
 While there is no reason to expect models 2 and 3 to yield biased estimates of 
the coefficients on female, they could yield biased estimates of the coefficients on  it s  
if, as one would expect, both individual social sanctioning experiences and 
contributions in the fourth game are correlated with contributions in the third game. 
To combat this problem, we remove the individual and household characteristics from 
equation 3 and re-estimate  8 a  and  9 a , while taking account of player fixed effects, 
and then, regress the player fixed effects on the vector of individual and household 
characteristics: 
it i it it ti gm s g 41 4 9 8 01 e m a a a + + + + =       4. 
i i i i i i i i i v e r l h x female 42 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 02 4 e a a a a a a a a m + + + + + + + + =   
where  i 4 m  is the individual player effect and it 41 e  and  it 42 e are assumed to be i.i.d. 
normal. In all of these models, it is the sign and significance of  1 a , the coefficient on 
female that pertains to hypothesis 1.     12 
 The test of hypothesis 2 requires a comparison of how male and female 
players change their contributing behaviour as a result of being socially sanctioned 
between the third and fourth games. For this, we need a dynamic model within which 
we also control for the effects of strategic, dynamic interplay between the players in 
each PG group. So, building on equation 4, we introduce a vector,  1 , - t ij g , containing 
four variables: contrib. (lagged), a lagged dependent variable; others’ contrib., the 
mean contribution made in the preceding game by the other four individuals in the 
player’s PG group; others’ contrib. sq., the square of that mean; and others’ contrib. 
cu., the cube of that mean. Because we still need the player fixed effects in order to 
ensure that we get unbiased estimates of  8 a , we estimate the resulting model using 
Arellano and Bond’s (1991) differenced generalized method of moments (GMM).
6 
The model takes the following form: 
it i t ij it it ti g gm s g 51 5 1 , 10 9 8 01 e m a a a a + + + + + = -      5. 
i i i i i i i i i v e r l h x female 52 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 02 5 e a a a a a a a a m + + + + + + + + =  
where  i 5 m  is the individual player effect and it 51 e  and  it 52 e are assumed to be i.i.d. 
normal. In this model, the coefficient  1 a captures the differential impact of moving 
towards increasingly socially interactive contexts on men’s and women’s 
contributions.  
Having correctly specified this dynamic model, we can test hypothesis 2 by 
introducing a vector of interaction terms, femalei* it s , into the first stage of model 5:  
                                                 
6 Dummy variables for the second and third games fall out of this model as the estimation uses the data 
from the second games for the lagged variables and the data from the first when constructing 
instrumental variables.    13 
it i it i t ij it it ti s female g gm s g 61 6 11 1 , 10 9 8 01 * e m a a a a a + + + + + + = -    6. 
i i i i i i i i i v e r l h x female 62 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 02 6 e a a a a a a a a m + + + + + + + + =  
where  i 6 m  is the individual player effect and it 61 e  and  it 62 e are assumed to be i.i.d. 
normal. The test of hypothesis 2 relates to the significance of the coefficients in  11 a  
although  1 a also remains of interest 
 Either model 5 or 6, which depending on the significance of the interaction 
terms, femalei* it s , can provide the basis for testing hypothesis 3 about the relative 
effectiveness of men and women when sanctioning others. Here, we introduce a 
vector,  i fsh , containing two variables: fem. in shamers lowi, the proportion of women 
among all those who shamed i for making too low a contribution; and fem. in shamers 
highi, the proportion of women among all those who shamed i for making too high a 
contribution. If model 5 is the basis, this yields the following: 
it i it t ij it it ti fsh g gm s g 71 7 12 1 , 10 9 8 01 e m a a a a a + + + + + + = -     7. 
i i i i i i i i i v e r l h x female 72 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 02 7 e a a a a a a a a m + + + + + + + + =  
where  i 7 m  is the individual player effect and it 71 e  and  it 72 e are assumed to be i.i.d. 
normal. The test of hypothesis 3 relates to the significance of the coefficients in  12 a . 
 The test of hypothesis 4, requires an analysis of how many other players 
sanction player i for making either a high or a low contribution. We define three 
dependent variables: shamersi, the number of other players who criticized player i; 
shamers lowi, the number of other players who criticized player i for making too low a 
contribution; and shamers highi, the number of other players who criticized player i 
for making too high a contribution. Each of these is then regressed on femalei, player   14 
i’s contribution in the third game,  i g3 , the square of that contribution, 
2
3i g , a number 
indicating how late in the discussion round player i’s contribution came up for 
discussion play orderi (takes the value one for the first player whose contribution is 
discussed, two for the second, and so on), and then i x ,  i h ,  i l ,  i r ,  i e , and  i v . So, the 
model to be estimated takes the form:- 
+ + + + + = i i i i i playorder g g female shamers 4
2
3 3 3 2 1 0 b b b b b  
i i i i i i i v e r l h x 8 10 9 8 7 6 5 e b b b b b b + + + + + +   8.  
Because shamersi takes zero as its modal value and cannot take values less than zero, 
we conduct a censored regression or tobit analysis. Similar models are estimated with 
shamers lowi and shamers highi as alternative dependent variables. In each case it is 
the sign and significance of  1 b  that pertains to hypothesis 4. 
 Finally, the test of hypothesis 5 requires an analysis of how many low and 
high contributors player i sanctioned. We define three dependent variables: targetsi, 
the number of other players criticized by player i; targets lowi, the number of low 
contributors criticized by player i; and targets highi, the number of high contributors 
criticized by player i. Each of these is then regressed on femalei, player i’s 
contribution in the third game,  i g4 , and then i x ,  i h ,  i l ,  i r ,  i e , and  i v . So, we estimate 
i i i i i i i i i i v e r l h x g female ets t 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 4 2 1 0 arg e g g g g g g g g g + + + + + + + + + =  9. 
Once again, we apply a censored regression or tobit analysis and estimate similar 
models with targets lowi and targets highi as alternative dependent variables. In each 
case it is the sign and significance of  1 g  that pertains to hypothesis 5. 
   15 
4. Data 
4.1 Experimental data 
The data on PG contributions made during the experiment is presented in Figures 1, 2, 
and 3, and in the upper half of Table 1. Mean contributions increased game-by-game 
from Zim$44.61 in the first to Zim$53.57 in the third and then declined to 50.26 in the 
fourth. In every game, women contributed more than men, although the difference is 
statistically significant according to a t-test (equal variance not assumed) only in the 
fourth.  The men’s contributions varied across games to a greater degree than the 
women’s. In particular, the men revised their contributions downwards between the 
third and fourth game, i.e., following the discussion, while women did not. 
 The data on criticisms made during the discussion round is presented in Figure 
4, and in the lower half of Table 1. Note that while there was considerably more 
criticism of players for contributing too little, some players were criticised for 
contributing too much. Despite their higher average contributions, more women than 
men were criticised for contributing too little. They also meted out more criticism to 
others who, in their opinion, had contributed too little. In contrast, fewer women than 
men were criticised for contributing too much. Similarly, they did less criticising of 
others who, in their opinion, had contributed too much. Only the third of these results 
is statistically significant.  
  
4.2 Demographic, economic, and social data 
Individual and household-level data are available for 261 out of the 308 nominees 
who showed up and played the game. The remaining 47 either belonged to households 
that were not included in the survey or could not be matched to the survey and other   16 
data due to coding errors in the field. T-tests indicate that the behaviour of these 47 
players during the experimental sessions was statistically indistinguishable (10% 
significance level) from that of the 261 to whom we can match individual and 
household-level data. The descriptive statistics presented in this section relate to the 
261 nominees that could be matched. The sources from which each of the 
demographic, economic, and social variables are drawn along with their method of 
generation are presented in Table 2.  The individual characteristics and economic 
household characteristics are all taken from the Zimbabwe Rural Household 
Dynamics Project (ZRHDP) survey. The data on blood and marriage ties between 
households within villages resulted from a series of participatory social mapping 
exercises designed and facilitated by Dekker (2003). And the data on associational 
memberships, religious affiliations and tribal descent was generated through a series 
of village-level and smaller focus group interviews using both semi-structured and 
structured questionnaires (Barr (2003)).  
 Table 3 contains the means and proportions relating to each of the variables to 
be used in the analysis for male and female players, and the sample as a whole. It also 
contains the standard deviations of the nine continuous variables. Of the 261 players 
112, 43 percent, were female. These were significantly younger (37.8 years as 
compared to 45) and significantly less educated (5.8 as compared to 6.8 years of 
formal schooling) than the men. They were also significantly less likely to be married 
(62 percent chance compared to a 75 percent chance) and significantly less likely to 
be heads of households (24 percent chance compared to a 68 percent chance).  
 The players are members of rural households involved in small-scale cash crop 
farming and livestock-raising. In 1999, the year prior to the experiment, the average 
household had 9 members, its holding of livestock was worth Zim$13,360 and its   17 
nominal household income was Zim$24,150. Female players tended to come from 
households of similar size and with similar livestock holdings, but with significantly 
lower incomes (Zim$18,900 compared with Zim$28,100) than male players.  
 On average, the players’ households have blood ties to 2.25 and marriage ties 
to 1.02 other households within the same village. The first of these figures is low by 
African standards and reflects the fact that eight out of the twelve villages included in 
the study are resettled. The resettlement programme in the early 1980s involved the 
selection of applicant households at random for inclusion in each newly created 
village. This also explains why the average household in this sample shares its tribal 
descent with only 22.5 percent of the households in the same village. The resettled 
households have compensated for the lack of kinship and ethnic ties by forming civil 
associations: the average household in this sample maintains 3.5 memberships in civil 
associations within their village (Barr (2003)). There is no significant difference 
between male and female players with respect to social connectedness. 
 Focusing on each player’s household head, 6.5 percent can be classified as 
Protestant, 3.5 percent as Catholic, 50.2 percent as belonging to new, indigenous, 
charismatic or apostolic churches, 2.3 percent as belonging to other world Christian 
religions, 25.7 percent as practicing traditional religions, and 11.9 percent as having 
no religion. The dominance of household heads whose tribal descent can be traced to 
the area northeast of Harare in the sample is a reflection of the location of the villages 
in the study. Ten out of the twelve are in or close to that area. The remaining two are 
situated between Harare and Mutanda. Heads of households from the other areas 
migrated to their current locations during either the resettlement exercise in the early 
1980s or the preceding colonial era. The distributions of male and female players with   18 
respect to their heads of households’ religions and tribal descents and their 
distribution across villages are statistically indistinguishable. 
   
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Are men less regarding of others when deciding how to behave? 
The estimated coefficients relating to models 1, 2, 3 and 4 are presented in Table 4. 
Before turning to our hypotheses, consider some of the results relating to the control 
variables. There is some evidence that older players and players coming from larger 
households contribute more in the PG games. However, perhaps surprisingly those 
coming from households with larger holdings of livestock contribute less. Those 
coming from households with more blood ties to other households in their village 
contribute significantly more. Religious affiliation, tribal descent, and village of 
residence also have significant effects on contributing behaviour. 
 In every game, women contributed more than men even after controlling for 
variations in the other economic, social and cultural factors mentioned above. In the 
game-by-game analyses (models 1 and 2), this difference only reaches significance in 
the fourth game. However, it is large and significant in the pooled regression (model 
3) and fixed effects analysis (model 4).  
 
4.2. Are men less responsive than women to the social or shame sanctions 
imposed by others? 
In models 2 and 3 only one of the four sanctioning variables, shamers low, has a 
significant coefficient and this is perversely signed due to omitted variable bias. In 
model 4, the bias is removed and the coefficient is insignificant, although it remains   19 
negative. Here also, the coefficient on shamers low vil. av. is positive, large and 
highly significant, suggesting that players are motivated to increase their level of 
cooperation not by the criticism that is directed at them personally, but by the 
criticism that is direct at all the individuals that behaved in the same way as them.  
This result is confirmed by the dynamic model 5, which is presented in Table 5. In 
this model the negative coefficients on shamers high and shamers high vil. av. are 
also significant suggesting that players who are criticised for making too high a 
contribution and/or observe others who made similar contributions being thus 
criticised, significantly reduce their contributions in the subsequent game. Also, note 
the negative and significant coefficient on the dummy variable game4, which 
indicates that if no use were made of the opportunity to impose social sanctions the 
players would contribute less in the subsequent game.  
 The lower half of the first column in Table 5 presents the results of the 
regressions that take the player fixed effects from the first stage of model 5 as there 
dependent variable. Here, we see that the coefficient on female is once again positive 
and significant, suggesting that women become increasingly more cooperative than 
men as we move to increasingly socially interactive contexts. 
 Model 6, which includes the interaction terms between female and the social 
sanctioning variables, is not an improvement on model 5: the interaction terms are 
neither jointly nor individually significant. So, model 5 remains the preferred model.  
 
4.3. Are men less effective than women at sanctioning others? 
In model 7, Table 5, we see that the greater the proportion of women among those 
who shame a player for contributing too little, the larger the upward adjustment in that   20 
players contribution in subsequent games. Further, including this variable causes the 
negative coefficient on shamers low to become significant once more. This indicates 
that, ceteris paribus, when players are criticised for making too low a contribution 
only or primarily by men, on average, they actually make an even lower contribution 
in the subsequent game. However, if a sufficient proportion of their critics are women, 
on average, they make a larger contribution in the subsequent game. 
 
4.4. Are men more likely than women to escape sanctioning by others when they 
behave in an antisocial manner? 
The upper half of Table 6 contains the estimated coefficients relating to three versions 
of model 8. In the first column shamers, the number of people who criticized player i, 
is the dependent variable. In the second column shamers low, the number of people 
who criticized player i for making too low a contribution, is the dependent variable. 
And in the third column shamers high, the number of people who criticized player i 
for making too high a contribution, is the dependent variable. Here, the signs and 
magnitudes of the significant coefficients on contrib. (lagged) and contrib. (lagged) 
sq. in the first column indicate that players are more likely to be criticised if they 
make a very high or a very low contribution. Then, in the second and third columns 
we see that those making lower contributions are more likely to be criticised for 
making too low a contribution and those making higher contributions are more likely 
to be criticised for making too high a contribution. Players whose behaviour was 
offered up for discussion later were more likely to be criticised, probably because 
potential critics became less inhibited as the discussion progressed. Ceteris paribus, 
young players and more educated players are more likely to be criticised for making 
too low a contribution. Married players and household heads are more likely to be   21 
criticised for making too high a contribution, possibly because they are risking their 
families’ return from the game rather than just their own. Ceteris paribus, players 
from households with higher incomes were less likely to be criticised, especially for 
making too high a contribution. Those from households with more marriage ties to 
other households in the same village received more criticism, especially for low 
contributions, and those from households maintaining more associational 
memberships were less likely to be criticised for making too low a contribution. Both 
tribal descent and village of residence affected the likelihood of a player being 
criticised, especially for making too low a contribution. And finally, while women are 
generally less likely to receive criticism, the coefficients in the models for the two 
specific forms of criticism are poorly defined.   
  
4.5. Are men less likely than women to sanction others who behave in an anti-
social manner? 
The lower half of Table 6 contains the estimated coefficients relating to three versions 
of model 9. In the first column targets, the number of people criticized by player i, is 
the dependent variable. In the second column targets low, the number of people 
criticized by player i for making too low a contribution, is the dependent variable. In 
the first column targets high, the number of people criticized by player i for making 
too high a contribution, is the dependent variable. Player i’s own contribution 
behaviour has no effect on how many other players he or she criticizes for making too 
low or too high a contribution. Education increases the number of targets, particularly 
the number criticized for making too high a contribution. Players from households 
with higher incomes criticise more people for making too low a contribution. Those 
from households with fewer marriage ties criticise fewer people and those from   22 
households who maintain more associational memberships criticise more high and 
low contributors. Once again, village of residence has a significant effect on how 
many other players, both low and high contributors, a player criticizes. However, the 
gender of the player has no significant effect at all.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The evidence relating to hypothesis 1, while mixed, tends to support the conclusion 
that, compared to women, men are less regarding of others when deciding how to 
behave at least within the context of the public goods game. They contributed less in 
each of the games they played and significantly less in the fourth. Some 
experimentalists might argue that this result is of little value compared to those 
derived from laboratory experiments incorporating double blind procedures and other 
experimental controls that are impractical in the field. This may be true to a degree, 
but we also need to ask how relevant observations made within the highly abstract 
setting of an experimental laboratory are to our understanding of human behaviour in 
everyday life. We propose that our field experiments should be seen as a complement 
to and viewed alongside the laboratory work undertaken in this area.  
Turning to hypothesis 2, there is no evidence to suggest that men are less 
responsive than women to social or shame sanctions imposed by others. This is the 
case with respect to both their first-hand experience of being sanctioned by others and 
their experience of witnessing the sanctioning of others who have behaved in a similar 
way to themselves. This notwithstanding, it is interesting to note the greater 
magnitude and significance of the gender difference as the level of social interaction 
associated with the game increases with the discussion round. These results suggest   23 
that it would be inappropriate to characterise the men in our sample as shameless, 
even though they show signs of being less pro-social than their female co-villagers.   
 With respect to hypothesis 3, the data suggest that men are less effective than 
women at sanctioning others. In fact, when men sanction non-cooperators they tend to 
have a perverse effect on their behaviour, causing them to become even less rather 
than more cooperative. With respect to hypothesis 4, it seems that men are less likely 
than women to escape sanctioning by others, although if we focus only on the 
sanctioning of uncooperative behaviour, this result is weak. And finally, with respect 
to hypothesis 5, men are neither more nor less likely than women to sanction others 
who have behaved in an uncooperative manner. 
 One complicating factor emerged during the analysis that was not anticipated 
at the time when the experiment was designed – in several of the villages not only low 
but also high contributors were socially sanctioned. That married players and 
household heads attracted more criticism of this kind suggests that the sanctioning 
villagers may have been taking account of their co-villagers’ competing obligations 
when deciding who to sanction. Note also that the more educated, i.e., those who 
might have had a greater understanding of the maths of the game, tended do more 
criticising of high contributors, possibly with the hope of enlightening them about the 
potential implications of their actions. For high contributors without family 
responsibilities and the less educated sanctioners, an alternative explanation might 
relate to a taste for conformity (Jones (1984)). Regardless of which if any of these 
explanations is correct, the question of whether we should adopt a definition of 
antisocial behaviour that includes high contributions remains to be answered. Further, 
if the competing obligations explanation is correct, its implications within the context 
of microfinance needs to be explore. In future research this finding might usefully be   24 
linked to the informal insurance function fulfilled by groups in microfiance 
arrangements.  
 To sum up, while the results suggest that women may indeed have a 
comparative advantage when it comes to functioning in groups, it does not, at least in 
Zimbabwe, appear to be related to their responsiveness to shame sanctions. Rather it 
relates to the behavioural rules they appear to have internalised, the way in which 
these rules interacts with the general level of social interaction, and their effectiveness 
at sanctioning others who behave antisocially. Whether these results are applicable 
beyond the bounds of the Zimbabwean villages within which the experiments were 
conducted remains to be seen. It is also not entirely clear at this stage whether and 
how behaviour within the experiments reflects behaviour in real situations including 
those involving group-lending contracts, although some of our results relating to the 
social connectedness and social status of the players are promising. Forging a link 
between experimental data and a wide array of data is, arguably, the most important 
contributions of the paper. The other is to demonstrate the potential value of the 
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution functions for contributions  
by men and women in games 1 to 4 






























































































































   28 
Figure 3: Cumulative distribution functions for  
men and women’s contributions by game 
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Table 1: Experimental behaviour of male and female players 
     
Men  Women     All  Sd. 
Sample size  175  133    308   
Contributions           
  in game 1  42.29  47.67    44.61  29.16 
  in game 2  49.14  54.44    51.43  31.08 
  in game 3  53.03  54.29    53.57  30.53 
  in game 4  47.31  54.14  *  50.26  30.82 
The shamers and the shamed           
  No. who shamed ego for low contribution  0.87  0.98    0.92  1.87 
  No. who shamed ego for high contribution  0.33  0.19  *  0.27  0.71 
  No. of others shamed  1.14  1.26    1.19  2.07 
  No. of low contributers shamed by ego  0.85  1.02    0.92  1.72 
   No. of high contributors shamed by ego  0.30  0.23     0.27  0.71 
Notes: ** means for males and females significantly different at the 5% level, according to a 
two tail test assuming non-equal variance, * means for males and females significantly 









Table 2: Origin of economic, social and cultural variables 
Variable  Source  Data generation  
method 
Individual characteristics 
  female 
  age 
  schooling 
  married  (percent) 
  head  (percent) 
ZRHID survey   Application of 
structured 
questionnaire to 
individual or  
household head 
Economic characteristics of household 
  hhsize (number of members) 
  livestock ('000 Zim $) 
  income ('000 Zim $) 




Social connectedness of household     
  blood relations 
  marriage relations 
Dekker (2003)  Participatory social 
mapping exercise 
  sametribe 
  memberships 
Religion of household head  
Geographical area of household head's 
tribal descent 




groups and individuals 
Village of residence  ZRHID survey  Administrative data   30 
Table 3: Economic, social, and cultural characteristics of players 
     
Men  Women     All     Sd. 
Sample size  149  112    261   
Individual characteristics           
  female (percent)        42.91%   
  age  45.01  37.79  ***  41.92  18.38 
  schooling  6.82  5.68  ***  6.33  3.19 
  married  (percent)  75.17%  61.61%  **  69.35%   
  head  (percent)  67.79%  24.11% ***  49.04%   
Economic characteristics of household           
  hhsize (number of members)  9.36  8.49    8.99  5.97 
  livestock ('000 Zim $)  13.88  12.65    13.36  11.35 
  income ('000 Zim $)  28.10  18.90  ***  24.15  27.37 
Social connectedness of household           
  blood   2.50  1.92    2.25  4.09 
  marriage   0.93  1.14    1.02  1.26 
  sametribe  22.95  22.04    22.56  13.37 
  memberships  3.66  3.16    3.45  2.66 
Religion of household head  (percent)           
  Protestant  7.38%  5.36%    6.51%   
  Catholic  3.36%  3.57%    3.45%   
  Apostolic  51.01%  49.11%    50.19%   
  Other Christian  3.36%  0.89%    2.30%   
  Traditional  26.85%  24.11%    25.67%   
  none  8.05%  16.96%    11.88%   
Geographical area of household head's tribal descent (percent) 
  north-east of Shamva  52.35%  46.43%    49.81%   
  between Shamva and Harare  5.37%  3.57%    4.60%   
  west of Harare  2.68%  5.36%    3.83%   
  between Harare and Mutanda  18.79%  18.75%    18.77%   
  south-east of Senegezi and Mutanda  7.38%  9.82%    8.43%   
  north or east of Mutanda  6.04%  8.04%    6.90%   
  from outside Zimbabwe  7.38%  8.04%    7.66%   
Village of residence (percent)           
  Chitepo  8.72%  10.71%    9.58%   
  Mudzinge  8.72%  14.29%    11.11%   
  Muringamombe  9.40%  5.36%    7.66%   
  Moturamehepo  4.70%  4.46%    4.60%   
  Mupedzanhamo  5.37%  2.68%    4.21%   
  Zvataida  6.71%  8.93%    7.66%   
  Tongogara  13.42%  6.25%    10.34%   
  Gwetera  16.11%  10.71%    13.79%   
  Guzemuka  7.38%  8.04%    7.66%   
  Madziwana  6.71%  11.61%    8.81%   
  Chechera  6.04%  9.82%    7.66%   
   Paswavavaviri  6.71%  7.14%     6.90%    
Notes: ** means for males and females significantly different at the 1% level, according to a two 
tail test assuming non-equal variance, * means for males and females significantly different at the 
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Table 5: Dynamic models of cooperative behaviour 
(model 5) (model 6) (model 7)
Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e.
constant 2.872 1.809 2.848 1.815 3.209 1.763
contrib. (lagged) -0.162 0.060 *** -0.153 0.061 ** -0.189 0.058 ***
others' contrib. -0.828 0.960 -0.761 0.960 -0.837 0.919
others' contrib. sq. 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.021 0.019
others' contrib. cu. -1.4E-04 1.3E-04 -1.3E-04 1.3E-04 -1.5E-04 1.2E-04
shamers low -1.255 1.319 -0.984 2.012 -3.166 1.395 **
shamers high -4.433 2.612 * -4.864 3.038 -3.896 2.881
shamers low vil.av. 20.771 4.211 *** 19.295 5.161 *** 21.729 3.982 ***
shamers high vil.av. -28.012 7.372 *** -21.490 11.008 * -24.716 7.358 ***
game4 -5.841 2.869 ** -8.062 3.112 ** -7.898 2.742 ***
fem * shamers low -1.236 2.733
fem * shamers high 0.940 6.201
fem * shamers low vil.av. 6.429 9.332
fem * shamers high vil.av. -13.404 14.207
fem * game4 4.812 4.206
fem. in shamers low  20.196 6.718 ***
fem. in shamers high -1.988 8.259
Obs. (FE and AB only) 616 616 616
Groups (FE and AB only) 308 308 308
Autocovariance test (p-value) 0.002 0.002 0.006
Sargan test (p-value) 0.894 0.956 0.644
constant (FE and AB only) 33.680 14.952 ** 33.411 14.955 ** 33.755 15.609 *
female 9.973 4.979 * 8.564 5.001 10.310 5.132 *
age 0.391 0.169 ** 0.393 0.168 ** 0.418 0.174 **
schooling -0.266 0.978 -0.253 0.967 -0.216 0.987
married 2.858 4.685 2.729 4.745 2.867 4.791
head 2.929 5.612 2.813 5.653 2.427 5.800
hhsize 0.845 0.249 *** 0.839 0.247 *** -0.337 0.178 *
livestock -0.313 0.177 -0.307 0.178 0.066 0.072
income 0.070 0.070 0.068 0.069 0.955 0.398 **
blood 0.942 0.371 ** 0.941 0.367 ** 2.035 1.453
marriage 2.087 1.456 2.037 1.437 -0.095 0.169
sametribe -0.099 0.168 -0.096 0.169 0.869 0.237 ***
memberships 0.412 1.642 0.395 1.630 0.334 1.644
Joint sig. of 5 religion 
dummies  0.077 * 0.079 * 0.081 *
Joint sig. of 6 tribal dummies  0.025 ** 0.025 ** 0.025 **
Joint sig. of 11 village 
dummies  0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
R sq. 0.254 0.252 0.264
Obs. 261 261 261
Arellano-Bond Arellano-Bond Arellano-Bond
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Table 6: Regression analysis of shaming behaviour 
Ego shamed by others
Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e.
Constant 3.261 1.271 ** 1.028 1.703 -6.429 2.092 ***
contrib. (lagged) -0.172 0.019 *** -0.005 0.030 0.059 0.045
contrib. (lagged) sq. 1.2E-03 1.8E-04 *** -2.6E-03 5.7E-04 *** -6.3E-05 3.3E-04
play order 2.019 0.584 *** 1.994 0.692 *** 1.338 0.745 *
female -0.960 0.409 ** -0.702 0.440 -0.780 0.585
age 0.020 0.015 0.038 0.018 ** 0.005 0.018
schooling 0.145 0.066 ** 0.346 0.092 *** 0.046 0.076
married 1.102 0.394 *** 0.579 0.439 0.976 0.555 *
head 0.566 0.501 0.029 0.601 1.525 0.656 **
hhsize -0.051 0.033 -0.073 0.046 0.020 0.036
livestock (Zim$ '000) 0.002 0.017 -2.5E-04 0.023 0.024 0.019
income (Zim$ '000) -0.017 0.008 ** -0.010 0.009 -0.021 0.011 *
blood -0.047 0.048 0.014 0.059 0.005 0.061
marriage 0.334 0.137 ** 0.407 0.180 ** 0.048 0.171
sametribe -0.005 0.015 -0.011 0.017 -0.018 0.019
memberships -0.103 0.109 -0.243 0.138 * 0.059 0.129
Joint sig. of 5 religion 
dummies  0.125 0.572 0.281
Joint sig. of 6 tribal 
dummies  0.128 0.007 *** 0.599
Joint sig. of 11 village 
dummies  0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.109
R sq. 0.261 0.522 0.349
Obs. 261 261 261
Ego shaming others
Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e.
constant -3.480 2.028 * -3.268 1.855 * -5.192 1.926 ***
contrib. (lagged) 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.008 0.004 0.008
female 0.094 0.650 0.440 0.594 -0.547 0.583
age 0.038 0.023 0.032 0.021 0.009 0.021
schooling 0.187 0.107 * 0.110 0.097 0.246 0.098 **
married 0.211 0.604 0.217 0.559 0.217 0.503
head -0.395 0.830 -0.110 0.756 -0.005 0.721
hhsize 0.006 0.051 0.017 0.046 -0.029 0.047
livestock (Zim$ '000) -0.010 0.029 -0.014 0.026 0.003 0.025
income (Zim$ '000) 0.020 0.013 0.020 0.012 * 0.007 0.011
blood 0.042 0.077 0.073 0.069 -0.053 0.069
marriage -0.451 0.251 * -0.277 0.225 -0.289 0.221
sametribe 0.017 0.024 0.009 0.022 0.041 0.025 *
memberships 0.389 0.167 ** 0.343 0.152 * 0.280 0.145 *
Joint sig. of 5 religion 
dummies  0.442 0.634 0.689
Joint sig. of 6 tribal 
dummies  0.615 0.684 0.926
Joint sig. of 11 village 
dummies  0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.092 *
R sq. 0.080 0.089 0.162
Obs. 261 261 261
shamers shamers low shamers high
targets targets low
(model 8) (model 8) (model 8)
(model 9) (model 9) (model 9)
targets high
 
 
 